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REMARKS OF AN SEC ASSOCIATE
GENERAL COUNSEL
Richard M. Humes, Esq.t
INTRODUCTION

I am going to focus on several significant current ethical issues
confronting attorneys practicing before the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("Commission" or "SEC").' I should warn you that I
approach these issues from the perspective of a regulator. There is a
distinct possibility that those of you who have an SEC practice might
approach these issues from a different vantage point. In view of the
significant public interest in detecting and preventing securities fraud,
I think that both regulators and practitioners share an interest in ensuring that attorneys observe, at least, minimal ethical standards in their
practice before the Commission.
First, I will address the types of recent cases the Commission has
brought against attorneys. Second, I will bring you up-to-date on the
status of the Commission's up-the-ladder reporting rule promulgated
under section
307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("Sarbanes-Oxley" or
"SOX"), 2 including the issues faced by in-house counsel who report
evidence of a possible violation up-the-ladder and are then fired by
their company and bring whistleblower claims under section 806 of
Sarbanes-Oxley. 3 Third, I will discuss the ethical considerations for
attorneys representing issuers who want to share work-product or
attorney-client materials with the Commission pursuant to a confidentiality agreement and the related question of whether the proposed

t Associate General Counsel, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington,
D.C.
I am obligated to advise you, as a member of the staff of the SEC, that the views I express today are my own, and not necessarily those of the Commission, any Commissioner, or
my colleagues at the Commission.
2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006)).
3 Id. § 806 (codified at Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 18 U.S.C. 78d-3 (2006)).
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new Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,4 if adopted, would
assuage these concerns.
INVESTIGATIONS AND PROCEEDINGS UNDER RULE 102(E)

Let me start with proceedings under Rule 102(e). 5 Under this rule
the Commission may bring professional disciplinary proceedings
against an attorney found to be lacking in character, to have engaged
in unethical or improper professional conduct, or to have willfully
violated or willfully aided and abetted violations of the federal securities laws. And, under Rule 203.7 of the Commission's rules relating
to formal investigative proceedings, the officer conducting an investigation may refer to the Commission any instances in which counsel
has been guilty of dilatory, obstructionist or contumacious conduct
during the course of an inquiry for consideration of whether a Rule
102(e) provision is appropriate.6
When an attorney has been found to have engaged in professional
misconduct, he may be sanctioned under Rule 102(e). Those sanctions include censures and temporary or permanent suspensions of the
privilege of appearing before the Commission. Of course, those attorneys who commit substantive violations of the securities laws are also
subject to injunctive actions and cease-and-desist proceedings. Further, as I will discuss in more detail later, under the Commission's upthe-ladder reporting rule, an attorney may be subject to discipline for
failing to report evidence of a material violation within the company
that the attorney represents. A general counsel, in turn, may be subject to discipline for failing to follow through on a report by conducting an inquiry or providing an appropriate response.
There are several contexts in which the professional misconduct of
an attorney may put him on the Commission's radar screen, and different remedies are needed to address the different concerns raised in
these contexts. Injunctive and ancillary relief, as well as cease-anddesist orders, are necessary to stop a violation and, where appropriate,
to make investors whole. In contrast, any sanction under Rule 102(e)
is designed to protect the Commission and its processes by preventing
lawyers who have engaged in unethical conduct from practicing before the agency. The Commission would not be fully protecting the
investing public or its processes were it simply to stop illegal conduct
4 Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Proposed Rule 502 (May 15,
2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EVHearing-April_2006.pdf (last visited
March 3, 2007).
5 Appearance and Practice Before the Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2006).
6 17 C.F.R. § 203.7 (2006).
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and to permit the lawyer to continue to practice for the agency where
he can do more harm to investors.
In recent years, the Office of the General Counsel has received referrals of allegations of professional misconduct by attorneys appearing before the agency, but it was not always that way. As we all
know, there has been a fundamental attitudinal shift in the way prosecutors and regulators have approached the significant increase in the
incidence of white-collar offenses and the lawyers who facilitate or
engage in such conduct. Fortunately, from a programmatic standpoint,
the Commission seems to, in picking up where it left off in 1981, following its decision in the Carterand Johnson case.7
In its opinion in that case, the Commission reversed an initial decision by a Commission administrative law judge that concluded that
two attorneys had aided and abetted their client's violations of the
federal securities laws by failing to correct misstatements contained in
the client's press releases and Commission filings concerning earnings.8 The Commission concluded that the existing ethics standards
governing the conduct of attorneys did not, unambiguously, proscribe
the behavior in question. 9 Thus, the Commission announced that in
the future it would interpret Rule 102(e) to require an attorney who
learns that a client is not satisfying its disclosure obligations to take
prompt action to end the client's noncompliance to avoid violating
professional standards. The Commission indicated that some prompt
action that leads to the conclusion that the lawyer is engaged in efforts to correct the underlying problem is required, rather than the
lawyer capitulating to the desires of a strong-willed but misguided

client.10
The Commission announced in its decision in Carterand Johnson
that it would solicit public comments regarding whether the newlyarticulated interpretation of the term "unethical or improper professional conduct" should be expanded or modified to provide clarity so
that attorneys would know what their professional obligations are in
these circumstances.' However, the Commission's announcement
engendered strong opposition from the private bar, which argued that
the Commission did not have express statutory authority to promulgate Rule 102(e), to regulate attorneys, or to sanction attorneys appearing before it who engage in professional misconduct. They concluded the Commission should leave such issues to the state bars. In
7 In re Carter and Johnson, SEC Release No. 34-17597 (Feb. 28, 1981).

8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.

I d.
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the end, the Commission never amended Rule 102(e) to reflect its
decision in Carter and Johnson as to what constitutes unethical or
improper professional conduct.
Further, the Commission's then-General Counsel expressed concern in a speech regarding the Commission's lack of either the time or
expertise to fashion a code of professional conduct for attorneys appearing before it.12 He further suggested that the Commission should
focus its attention on bringing Rule 102(e) proceedings against attorneys when the alleged misconduct represents a violation of established state ethical or professional misconduct rules and has a direct
impact on the Commission's internal processes. He also indicated that
the Commission generally should not institute Rule 102(e) proceedings against attorneys absent a judicial determination that the lawyer
has violated the securities laws.
Consequently, between 1981 and 2002, while the Commission
brought actions against attorneys to enjoin violations of the securities
laws, it did not adopt a comprehensive set of standards of professional
conduct for attorneys. As we all know, this landscape changed dramatically with the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. The Act not only
directed the Commission to promulgate the up-the-ladder reporting
requirements, but also expressly authorized the Commission to promulgate minimum ethical standards for attorneys appearing before the
agency in the representation of issuers.
Further, in section 602 of SOX, Congress amended section 4(c) of
the Securities Exchange Act by specifically adopting the language of
Rule 102(e) authorizing the Commission to discipline attorneys appearing before it who engage in unethical or improper professional
conduct. 13 In my view, Congress, by granting the Commission such
broad authority, intended to empower the Commission to comprehensively address professional misconduct by attorneys appearing before
the agency. Thus, the Commission can now reach conduct that violates substantive provisions of the securities laws, current Commission regulations regarding professional conduct, and any additional
ethical standards the SEC determines in the future to promulgate under the authority granted by SOX.
Some have argued that the SEC should not take on the responsibility for enforcing ethics rules even when the violation occurs in connection with practice before the agency because the rules should be
12 See Edward F. Greene, General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, Lawyer
Disciplinary Proceedings Before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks to the New
York County Lawyers' Association, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,089 (Jan. 18, 1982).
13 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 602, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78d-3 (2006)).
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enforced by the state bar associations. They also argue that the SEC
does not have the expertise to interpret or apply ethics provisions.
However, a violation of an ethics rule during an SEC proceeding
has the potential to adversely affect the outcome of the proceeding
and the Commission's processes. While the Commission has
delegated authority to its Ethics Counsel to refer this type of
misconduct to state bars for their consideration, discipline imposed by
a state bar will not necessarily address the Commission's concern
with protecting its processes from unethical attorneys. Further, any
sanction imposed by the state bar may not include provisions that
protect investors by, for example, suspending the attorney's privilege
of appearing before the Commission.
Questions about the Commission's expertise in these matters is a
legitimate one. Since the enactment of SOX and its mandate to promulgate standards of professional conduct for attorneys, the SEC has
been working diligently to develop the expertise to address our newly-refound responsibilities in this area.
Authority to investigate and prosecute ethics violations by attorneys continues to reside in the Office of the General Counsel. This
reflects the consideration that the authority to pursue proceedings
involving allegations of professional misconduct should not be
viewed as augmenting the Division of Enforcement's mandate to investigate securities violations. While those of us at the Commission
are confident that the Division would not use any responsibility to
enforce ethical standards as a basis to obtain leverage against lawyers
in pursuing and settling its cases, to avoid even the perception that
this may be the case, the authority in this area rests with the General
Counsel.
Accordingly, we have created a new unit in the office, headed by
an Assistant General Counsel, to handle these matters. Of course, any
formal investigation or order instituting proceedings against an attorney must still be approved by the Commission. In conducting our
inquiries, we provide the same rights and procedures as the Division
of Enforcement provides in conducting its inquiries. Indeed, earlier
this year the Commission issued a rule that authorizes the Office of
the General Counsel to conduct preliminary inquiries without a formal order so that immaterial allegations of attorney 4misconduct can
be examined without a formal order of investigation.1

14 Appearance and Practice Before the Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2006); Description of Duties of the General Counsel, Securities Act Release No. 53755, 71 Fed. Reg. 91,
27385 (May 3, 2006).
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While we have to do our job and conduct thorough investigations,
we are sensitive to the fact that our inquiries can have a palpable
affect on an attorney's professional reputation and livelihood. This
concern reminds me of the statement of the Christopher Plummer
character in the movie Syriana, who said that "you are innocent until
you are investigated."' 5 Those of us at the Commission working on
these cases adhere to a different notion: you are innocent until we can
prove a violation.
In discharging our responsibilities in this area, we are very mindful
of the fact that any actions we take may be interpreted by the private
bar and their clients as designed to chill zealous advocacy by counsel
in investigations and administrative proceedings. I can assure you,
however, that this is not our goal. We are not focusing on creative but
nonfrivolous legal arguments, reasonable contentions as to the facts,
or innocent errors in legal judgment by an attorney that do not threaten the Commission's processes or investors. Instead, we concentrate
on cases in which an attorney appears to have engaged in intentional
or, at least, reckless misconduct that also violates substantive or ethical obligations to which an attorney is subject.
A brief review of the recent cases the Commission has brought
16
against attorneys bears this out. Earlier this year in In re Rasmussen,
the Commission imposed a three-year suspension under Rule 102(e)
against a former senior counselor at Enron for his role in a scheme to
improperly accelerate the recognition of revenue from the sale of a
construction contract, which resulted in Enron filing a false Form 10K. In In re Brown, 17 the Commission imposed a five-year suspension
under Rule 102(e) against Brown, the former General Counsel of
Management Systems Corporation, who reviewed financial statements filed with the Commission that materially misstated results of
operations. In addition, he was responsible for providing the company's auditors with inaccurate information.
Similarly, in recent cease-and-desist proceedings against attorneys
the cases involved professional misconduct that threatened investors.
In In re Google,' 8 the Commission entered a cease-and-desist order
against David Drummond, the General Counsel of Google, for permitting Google to issue unregistered securities under its stock option
plan. And, in In re Isselman, 19 the Commission entered a cease-anddesist order against the formal General Counsel of Electro Scientific
15SYRIANA
Opinion
11Opinion
IS Opinion
19Opinion
16

(Warner Bros. Pictures 2005).

and Order,
and Order,
and Order,
and Order,

Securities
Securities
Securities
Securities

Exchange Act Release No. 53662 (Apr. 17, 2006).
Exchange Act Release No. 52864 (Dec. 1,2005).
Act Release No. 82435 (Jan. 13, 2005).
Exchange Act Release No. 50428 (Sept. 23, 2004).
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Industries, Inc. for failing to provide important information to the
company's audit committee, board of directors, and auditors regarding a transaction that enabled the company to report a profit instead of
a loss.
While I cannot comment publicly on the details of cases we are
currently investigating, we would be interested in allegations of professional misconduct that involve obstructing our proceedings, such
as attempting to suborn perjury, falsely certifying that document productions are complete, altering documents provided to the agency, or
withholding documents that are responsive to agency subpoenas.
One additional point in this area that may give some comfort, even
where the Commission has imposed a suspension under Rule 102(e),
is that there is usually an opportunity for re-entry upon a showing that
the attorney has fully complied with the Commission's order and has
not engaged in any other conduct in the meantime that would bear on
his fitness to resume practicing.
UP-THE-LADDER REPORTING UNDER SECTION
SARBANES-OXLEY

307 OF

Let me bring you up-to-date on the current status of the rules under
section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and what lawyers who are
whistleblowers are experiencing. In section 307 of SOX, Congress
directed the Commission to promulgate a rule requiring an attorney
for an issuer to report evidence of a material violation up the corporate ladder to the chief legal officer, the audit committee, or another
committee of the board until he obtains an appropriate response.2 °
The final rule became effective in August 2003.21 The Commission
did not, at that time, resolve the prickly issue of whether to require
attorneys to withdraw and report evidence of the violation to the
Commission in the event the issuer does not provide an appropriate
response. Instead, the Commission asked for further public comment
on alternative proposals on whether it should promulgate a mandatory
reporting out rule.
The first alternative was to require reporting out by retained
counsel when the violations are ongoing, and to have permissive
reporting out as to past violations. The second alternative was the socalled Form 8-K approach: when an attorney has reported a violation
20 Rules of Professional Responsibility for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006)).
21 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8185, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 47276, Investment Company Act Release
No. 25919, 68 Fed. Reg. 25, 6295 (Aug. 5, 2003).
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and has not received an appropriate response, the issuer must file a
Form 8-K disclosing that its counsel has withdrawn for professional
reasons. The rationale for this alternative was that it should assuage
the concerns of attorneys that even the reporting to the Commission
of a withdrawal would be deemed a violation of the attorney-client
privilege.
The Commission received numerous comments on these proposals. As one would predict, most attorneys in private practice and bar
groups argued against the reporting out; whereas, most academics and
groups representing investors urged that we adopt such a rule. To
date, the Commission has not taken final action on the proposal and
no meeting to do so has been scheduled. In the meantime, we can
observe how effective the existing rules are in getting the evidence to
the appropriate corporate officials and whether these officials are acting responsibly.
Currently, the Commission has not brought any enforcement actions under its section 307 rules. I do not find that particularly surprising, as we never thought that once the rules became effective, we
would start looking solely at conduct by attorneys that might be problematic. Instead, we thought we would only see a Section 307 case
after the Division of Enforcement conducted an investigation and
found corporate misconduct. At that point, we would ask whether the
lawyers knew about the misconduct, and if they did, what actions did
they take? Personally, I would be perfectly satisfied if the Commission never had occasion to bring a case under the section 307 rules
because to the extent that our rules successfully move the corporate
culture in the direction of expecting and encouraging employees to
report potential violations, then the rule will have been effective even
in the absence of any proceeding against an individual attorney. There
is considerable evidence that this is occurring. Many issuers have put
in place internal reporting requirements that are at least as stringent as
those in our section 307 rules and they generally apply to all employees, not just to attorneys. Further, most law firms with a significant
SEC practice have also put in place procedures to address their obligations under the rules.
There is also anecdotal evidence that the rules are working. My
colleagues and I at the Commission have been advised that attorneys
have reported situations in which they have had difficulty convincing
clients to make disclosures they believe are required by the securities
laws, but when they advised the clients they had to discuss with their
other partners and upper management their obligations under section 307 rules, the clients agreed to make the disclosures.
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One issue that arose when the rule became effective was whether it
preempted inconsistent state ethics rules. There are a number of states
that have rules that would prohibit an attorney from making a permissive report to the Commission of an ongoing violation as permitted
under our rule. Washington State has such a rule 22 and the Washington State Bar Association was considered amending its rules to provide specifically that attorneys should not comply with our rules. In
its view, because our rules permit reporting out of ongoing violations
and Washington's rules prohibit it, there was no conflict because the
attorney can elect not to report out. In response, the Commission's
General Counsel wrote a letter that is posted on our website stating
his view that our rules preempt Washington's rules because Supreme
Court precedent establishes that where a state rule prohibits what a
federal rule permits, the state rule is preempted because it would
in23
terfere with the discretion provided under the federal regime.
Similarly, the State of California contacted us and asked us not to
enforce our rule as to California attorneys because compliance could
put them in jeopardy of being subject to discipline by California authorities. We responded that any jeopardy was being created by California threatening its attorneys if they complied with our rules. We
urged California to stand down as our rule is, presumptively, valid
and their rule is, presumptively, preempted.
Eventually, California put out an alert advising lawyers not to
comply with our rules without expert legal guidance. On the other
hand, North Carolina recently announced that it deemed its ethics
rules preempted by the part of Rule 307 on the issue of permissive
reporting out. It seems to me the preemption issue has been resolved
by court decisions over the past several years that establish that inconsistent state ethics rules are preempted. In particular, in Jevne v.
Superior Court,2 4 the California Supreme Court held that state ethics
rules for arbitrators were preempted by SEC-approved National Association of Securities Dealers Code of Arbitration Procedure ethics
provisions for two reasons: first, because the SEC had the statutory
authority to approve those rules; and second, I think more importantly, although it was not impossible to comply with both sets of
rules, attempts to comply with both would impede compliance with

22

WASHINGTON RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2006).

23Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, to David W. Savage, President-Elect, Washington State Bar Association, Washington State
Bar Association's Proposed Opinion on the Effect of the SEC's Attorney Conduct Rules (July
23, 2003), availableat http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spchO72303gpp.htm.
24111 P.3d 954 (Cal. 2005).
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the SEC-approved rules.25 There have been similar decisions on this
issue in other cases and they have agreed with our view. Although
these cases are not one hundred percent on point, I think the case for
preemption is even stronger as to the section 307 rules, because they
were specifically mandated by Congress.
PROTECTIONS FOR ATrORNEY WHISTLEBLOWERS UNDER
SECTION 806 OF SOX

Another ethical dilemma for attorneys arises as a result of the intersection of the section 307 rules and section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley,
which provides whistleblower protections for persons, including lawyers, who report evidence of violations within an issuer. Section 806
prohibits an issuer from discriminating against an employee in the
terms and conditions of employment in retaliation for lawfully providing information to Congress, the SEC, or any supervisor that the
employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of any SEC rule
relating to fraud against shareholders.26 An issuer that violates this
provision is subject to civil and criminal sanctions. SOX places responsibility for administering these proceedings on the Secretary of
Labor.
The SOX whistleblower protections are critical for an attorney
who may report a violation by his issuer or client but fears that reporting the violation would expose him to retaliation, including the possible loss of his job. But any attorney who makes a report under the
section 307 rules runs the risk that in any proceeding challenging any
retaliation in which the attorney seeks to use his report and/or the
client's response, the attorney will be accused of improperly disclosing client confidences, thereby exposing him to charges that he has
violated state ethics rules. The attorney also runs the risk that his report and management's responses-perhaps the best evidence of his
whisleblowing activity-will be excluded as privileged.
This squarely raises the issue of the scope of the permissible use of
a section 307 report by an attorney in SOX whistleblower litigation.
Clearly, if attorneys who comply with our rules cannot introduce
evidence of their compliance, then section 806 will be rendered a
nullity as far as lawyers are concerned. In a number of section 806
cases that are pending before the Secretary of Labor, we have seen
threats by former employers against lawyers if they use their reports
in the proceedings. Fortunately, section 205.3(d)(1) of our section 307
25
2

Id. at 969-71.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006)).
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rules expressly provides that any report or response thereto "may be
used by an attorney in connection with any investigation, proceeding,
or litigation
in which the attorney's compliance with this part is in
27
issue.,

At least one court decision has reached this precise issue and concluded that an attorney may use client confidences in these proceedings. In Willy v. Administrative Review Board,2 8 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals correctly started its analysis by concluding that federal law governs the issue and not state ethics rules. The court concluded that the Model Rules specifically provide that a lawyer may
reveal information relating to the representation to the extent the lawyer believes necessary to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and client, and that a
between a lawyer
whistleblower proceeding was the type of dispute
29
and client contemplated by the Model Rules.
While the facts in Willy predated our Rule 205.3, and thus the
court could not rely on our rule, Rule 205.3 is just the kind of federal
law that the Fifth Circuit was referring to as guiding its analysis.
Thus, we are cautiously optimistic that, going forward, attorneys will
not be hindered in establishing section 806 cases by claims that in
doing so they are improperly disclosing client confidences. However,
it still remains to be seen whether Willy will be followed in whistleblower cases that arise in jurisdictions outside the Fifth Circuit. We
know that the issue has been raised in a number of other cases, and
we are monitoring them for possible amicus participation by the
Commission.
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS TO PROTECT WORK-PRODUCT

Next I would like to address confidentiality agreements to protect
work-product and proposed Rule 502 of the Federal Rule of Evidence. For a number of years issuers under investigation have provided materials to the Commission staff, pursuant to confidentiality
agreements that provide that the issuer is not waiving privileges for
the information. In exchange, the Commission agrees that it will not
contend that the production constitutes a waiver of any applicable
privileges as to third parties and as to additional documents not produced.
27 17 C.F.R. 205.3(d)(1) (2006); Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8185, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 47276, Investment Company Act Release No. 25919, 68 Fed. Reg. 25, 6295 (Aug. 5, 2003).
28 423 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2005).
29 Id. at 499-501.
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The materials that have been of the most interest and benefit to the
Commission are the internal reports prepared by retained attorneys for
issuers examining problems with financial reporting. These reports
usually fall within the scope of the work-product doctrine and often
include memoranda or attorney interviews with company employees.
Reports may also reflect communications protected by the attorneyclient privilege.
The Commission has argued in a number of amicus briefs that
state and federal courts should find that companies under investigation by the SEC do not waive work-product protection as to third parties by disclosing such internal reports to the Commission pursuant to
a confidentiality agreement. The Commission has taken this position
because allowing companies under investigation to produce privileged information without waiving privileges serves the public interest, as it significantly enhances the Commission's ability to conduct
expeditious investigations and to obtain relief for defraud investors.
Although the Commission must verify that these internal reports
are accurate and complete and must conduct its own independent investigation, doing so is far less time consuming and less difficult than
conducting investigations without the internal reports. Even the majority opinion in the Columbia/HCA30 decision from the Sixth Circuit
Court, which declined to recognize such an agreement and instead
found a waiver, acknowledged that permitting companies to disclose
privileged information to government investigators results in considerable savings in time and fiscal expenditure and encourages both
self-policing by companies and settlement of disputes.31
However, the government has enjoyed only limited success in
convincing the courts to recognize these agreements. The courts that
have accepted them have done so primarily because they believe it is
in the public interest for companies to be able to share privileged information with the government without waiving privileges as to third
parties. Those courts that have rejected them have done so primarily
because they can not reconcile allowing a company under investigation to reveal work-product to a potential adversary with the historical
purpose of the work-product doctrine to keep an attorney's trial preparation materials out of the hands of its adversary.
The Tenth Circuit Court's recent decision in In re Qwest3 2 has cast
further doubt on the viability of these confidentiality agreements.
There, the district court presiding over a private action against Qwest
30

In re Columbia/HCA HealthCare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir.

2002).
31 Id. at 303.
32

In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006).
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declined to give affect to an agreement between the Department of
Justice and Qwest covering a report of potential corporate
wrongdoing prepared by its retained counsel because it found that
Qwest waived work-product and attorney-client protections by
sharing the documents with the government. 33 The Tenth Circuit
Court affirmed the district court, rejecting the argument that if courts
do not recognize such agreements companies will cease cooperating
with law enforcement officials absent protection under the selective
waiver doctrine. The court found it significant that Qwest had
disclosed to the government 220,000 pages of protected materials,
knowing that the private action was pending against it, in the face of
what it saw as almost unanimous circuit court rejection of the
selective waiver doctrine and the absence of any Tenth Circuit
precedent to support it.
These developments raise at least two distinct issues for securities
lawyers. First, can lawyers tell their corporate clients in good faith
that they should execute these confidentiality agreements with any
realistic expectation that they will be given effect by a court presiding
over a private action against the company in which the internal report
is sought? Second, assuming there is a basis for companies to continue to enter into these agreements, should the companies and the bar
resist entering into these agreements because they undermine the attorney-client privilege?
As to the first issue, it is worth noting that the district court handling the class action against McKesson recently accepted one of
these agreements. 34 While a lawyer would have an obligation to advise his client as to the state of the law in any particular district court
or circuit, there has been no definitive judicial decision rejecting such
agreements. Besides, as the Tenth Circuit Court recognized in Qwest,
these cases are fact-specific. The Qwest court noted repeatedly that it
was deciding the case on the basis of the record before it and seemed
to be particularly skeptical of Qwest's arguments because the agreement was entered into when Qwest was already in private litigation
concerning the same subject matter and thus knew that the documents
were likely to be subpoenaed and that the risk of finding a waiver was
substantial.
Under different circumstances, such as when there is no pending
private action at the time of the agreement or, if there is a pending
action, it is in a jurisdiction in which there is support for the doctrine,
then the outcome may well be different. Further, several of the courts
33 Id. at 1194.
34

In re McKesson HBOC Inc. Sec. Litig., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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addressing these issues have appropriately distinguished between
requests for attorney-client materials and those seeking solely workproduct. It is universally recognized that sharing attorney-client materials with a potential adversary waives the privilege. On the other
hand, there are a number of situations in which potential adversaries
may share work-product without waiving the protection, such as
when parties have a common interest or a joint defense agreement.
While the Commission has not maintained in its amicus briefs that it
has a common interest with those persons it investigates, corporate
parties to these agreements have made such arguments.
In April 2006, the Commission provided to the advisory
committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence testimony on proposed
Rule 502. 35 That rule, if adopted, will provide that a person under
investigation may voluntarily disclose attorney-client and workproduct materials to federal agencies without waiving privileges, even
in the absence of a written confidentiality agreement. On August 10,
2006, the advisory committee published for comment a revised
version of the proposed rule that would provide these protections, and
it specifically invited public comment on whether the proposed rule
would promote cooperation with the government and decrease the
cost of government investigation and prosecutions. The comment
period ran until February 15, 2007.
There is opposition to this proposed rule from the private bar
which has expressed concern since the mid 1990's that the principal
government law enforcement agencies have developed policies and
guidelines that are designed to induce corporations and other business
entities to waive or not assert privileges and the result has been a
marked increase in the compelled, requested, or suggested voluntary
waivers of privileges. In their view, there has emerged a culture of
waiver in which government agencies expect a company under investigation to waive privileges, and many companies now do so without
even being asked, believing there is the no practical alternative. But
the Commission has concentrated its efforts on obtaining reports prepared by retained counsel after the discovery of potentially fraudulent
conduct when reports are prepared at that behest of the board of directors or the audit committee with full knowledge that they are likely to
be shared with the SEC. The Commission has not generally sought
legal advice provided contemporaneously with the conduct under
investigation. While an issuer may make the determination that it is in
35 Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Proposed Rule 502 (May 15,
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the entity's best interest to produce the record of contemporaneously
provided legal advice-such as when the privileged communications
were with former management that may have engaged in misconduct
and have been ousted-that is not a waiver that the Commission staff
has generally sought.
Second, the bar is concerned that, with respect to the internal reports that are of interest to the staff, companies no longer have the
predictable protections of confidentiality because, realistically, they
do not have the option to maintain privileges without being viewed as
uncooperative. This position ignores the fact that current management
may appropriately determine to disclose privileged evidence of misconduct by prior management because it is in the best interest of the
entity. And even when the privileged evidence of misconduct may
concern present management, it may still be in the best interest of the
entity to disclose this information because it may show self-policing
and address the concerns of investors, shareholders, and the Commission about possible management misconduct. The company may appropriately put the entity's best interest ahead of those of a current
officer who may be guilty of misconduct and would prefer the entity
to assert the privilege to protect his own personal interest.
To conclude, it is evident we are in an era of dynamic change regarding the ethical obligations facing attorneys representing corporate
clients in SEC proceedings. Achieving the proper balance on these
complex issues is challenging for regulators as we seek to harmonize
protecting corporate clients' legitimate interests in zealous representation with the need for effective law enforcement for the protection of
investors.

